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Wartime labor regulation, the industrial
pluralists, and the law of collective bargaining
J A M E S B. A TL E S O N

Since the end o f World War II, labor relations theory and the law of
collective bargaining have been closely intertwined. Both systems are
premised upon the stabilizing influence of unions, collective bargaining,
and arbitration. Yet, as Ronald Schatz notes in this volume, the industrial
and economic convolutions of the past decade have created a crisis in
the once unchallenged orthodoxy that has until recently constituted in
dustrial relations thought.
A loose-knit group of postwar scholars and practitioners, who might
well be characterized as "industrial pluralists," are largely responsible
for the body of rules regulating collective bargaining, as well as the
supportive vision of industrial relations.1 This group developed a set of
assumptions about the necessary legal structure of collective bargaining,
its regulation, and the appropriate forms of dispute resolution, which
has been clearly reflected in the Supreme Court decisions of the late 1950s
and 1960s. In this period, the federal judiciary for the first time defined
The preparation of this chapter has been supported by a fellowship from the National
Endowment for the Humanities and a research grant from the State University of New
York at Buffalo. I thank the many who read and commented on various draf ts, especially
Fred Konefsky, Nelson Lichtenstein, Katherine Stone, and Clyde Summers. I also wish to
express heartfelt appreciation to David Woods, class of 1988, and to Joyce Farrell for their
assistance.
1See Katherine Von Wezel Stone, "The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law," Yale
Law Journal 90 (198 1 ) : 1509-80; Staughton Lynd, "Government Without Rights: The
Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox," Industrial Relations Law Journal 4 (1981): 483;
Howell John Harris, "The Snares of Liberalism? Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Shaping
of Federal Labour Relations Policy in the United States, ca. 1915-1947," in Steven Tolliday
and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds. , Shop Floor Bargaining and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985).
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the legal structure of collective bargaining, creating a system dominated
by the promotion of arbitral settlement of contract disputes and the
discouragement of collective action.2
I� dustrial pluralist thought had much in common with consensus the
ories in other disciplines in the 1940s and 1 950s, combining a search for
peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms with a reluctance to discuss ex
isting imbalances in power or issues of class. The industrial pluralists
focused upon the creation of legal rules and administrative processes to
resolve workplace conflicts. The predominant device, however, was to
be arbitration, a private mechanism that could supplant self-help, judicial
intervention, or administrative regulation. The pluralists desired to hu
manize and regularize the workplace, _transforming "the anarchy of the
marketplace, which exploited workers, into the harmony of a 'modern'
cooperative capitalism, which protected workers. "3 The views of the
pluralists themselves can perhaps be traced to the Wisconsin school and
John Commons and also to prewar theories of efficient, administrative
resolution of industrial relations problems.4
Many of the pluralists were in government positions during World
War II, a period in which it was critical to find efficient systems for the
resolution of labor disputes that would serve as alternatives to strikes.
Labor lawyers and economists, often very young and sometimes just out
2The Supreme Court in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, for instance, cites Archibald Cox,
"Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts," Harvard Law Review 67 (1954): 602-4 ,
to support its conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar specific enforcement
of the arbitration clause. In the famous trilogy of arbitration decisions in 1960, Cox is
cited in two cases and Harry Shulman is cited in United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf
Navigation, 363 U.S. 574, 578-9, 579 n. 6, 581, 583 n. 7 (1960). See also, United
Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing, 363 U.S. 564, 568 n. 6 (1960).
3Melvyn Dubofsky, "Legal Theory and Workers' Rights: A Historian's Critique," Industrial
Relations Law Journal 4 (1981 ) : 49 7. The pluralists' relationship to the government
liberal tradition embodied by Senator Robert Wagner has not been studied. Both groups
believed in a government framework for private action, although the Wagner Act focused
upon bargaining, not contract administration. See Daniel Sipe, "A Moment of the State:
The Enactment of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Pennsylvania, 19 81); Stanley Vittoz, New Deal Labor Policy and the American Industrial
Economy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987); Theda Skocpol, "Po
litical Response to Capitalist Crises: Nco-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of
the New Deal," Politics and Society 10 (1980): 155-201; Peter Irons, The New Deal
Lawyers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).
4As Steven Fraser has shown, the current system looks very much like that created by
Sidney Hillman's garment workers' union in the 1920s, except for the present supportive
legal apparatus. Steven Fraser, "Dress Rehearsal for the New Deal: Shop-Floor Insurgents,
Political Elites, and Industrial Democracy in the Amalgamated Clothing Workers," in
Michael Frisch and Daniel Walkowitz, eds., Working-Class America (Champaign: Uni
versity of Illinois Press, 1983), 212.
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of college, supplied the demand for wartime specialists. The first public
members of agencies such as the National War Labor Board were skilled
in mediation and arbitration. As characterized by Howell Harris:
They were liberal pluralists, committed to the development of a labor relations
system in which the triple objectives of efficiency, order, and representative de
mocracy could be reconciled. They believed in the Wagner Act's legislative phi
losophy, and in strong, responsible unions as agents for its implementation. They
preferred to see industrial disputes settled in decentralized, voluntarist negotia
tions between the parties rather than on terms imposed by the state from the
center, or unilaterally determined by employers.5

One of the War Labor Board's most important and enduring contribu
tions was the development of a group of experienced arbitrators who
profoundly affected postwar labor law and practice. As Edwin Witte
noted in 1 952, the "great majority of the labor arbitrators of the present
day gained their first direct experience in service on the staff of the War
Labor Board or on its disputes panels. "6 With much justification, a
speaker at an early meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators
greeted his audience as the "War Labor Board Alumni Association."7
The academy's first president, Ralph T. Seward, for instance, had been
executive secretary of the National Defense Mediation Board and a public
member of its successor, the War Labor Board. In 1 944, he became the
impartial umpire for General Motors and the UAW. William Simkin, one
of the academy's vice-presidents, had been chair of the Shipbuilding
Commission and associate member of the War Labor Board. The acad
emy's original Board of Governors was also filled with veterans of war
time Washington. Although not active in the formation of the National
Academy of Arbitrators, George W. Taylor often spoke at early meetings
and helped draft the code of ethics eventually accepted by the academy
as well as the American Arbitration Association and the Federal Media
tion and Conciliation Service.
Other influential scholars and writers who gained experience in the
wartime agency were Benjamin Aaron, David L. Cole, G. Allan Dash,
Alex Elson, Nathan E. Finesinger, Jesse Freidin, Alexander H . Frey,
Sylvester S. Garrett, Jr., Lloyd Garrison, Lewis M. Gill, James J. Healy,
5Howell Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies ofAmerican Business
in the 1 940s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 49.
6Edwin Witte, quoted in Roger Abrams and Dennis Nolan, "American Labor Arbitration:
The Maturing Years," Florida Law Review 35 (1983): 577.
7Charles Killingsworth, "The Chronicle," Journal of the National Academy of Arbitrators
(February 1988): 5.
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Theodore W. Kheel, Thomas E. Larkin, Eli Rock, Peter Seitz, Ralph T.
Seward, Harry Shulman, William E. Simkin, George W. Taylor, and W.
Willard Wirtz. In addition, WLB staff positions were filled with people
who would become influential in labor history, economics, and labor
relations, such as E. Wright Bakke, Douglas V. Brown, John T. Dunlop,
George H. Hildebrand, Louis Jaffe, Vernon H. Jenson, Clark Kerr, Rich
ard Lester, E. Robert Livernash, Lester B. Orfield, Sumner H. Slichter,
Edwin H. Witte, and Dale Yoder.8
Their government experience during the war stressed productivity and
the critical need for labor peace, profoundly shaping their views on ar
bitration and collective bargaining. This group, who would become in
fluential postwar writers and practitioners of labor law and labor
relations as well as arbitrators, is the crucial link that explains why the
current law of collective bargaining mirrors the web of rules created by
the War Labor Board.
This essay focuses on two areas of War Labor Board jurisprudence
and their current parallels. The first area concerns the administration and
enforcement of collective agreements; the second deals with the range of
subjects falling within the scope of mandatory bargaining under the Na
tional Labor Relations Act. Prior to the Taft-H artley Act of 1 947, there
was little federal law defining collective bargaining or the means by which
agreements could be enforced.9 The Wagner Act of 1 935 required em
ployers to bargain in good faith, and the Supreme Court had made
collective agreements predominant over individual contracts of employ
ment.10 The Wagner Act, however, did not focus on dispute resolution,
8These individuals are listed in the National War Labor Board Termination Report, vol.
1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947):2-46; War Labor Reports 6
(1943): 24; War Labor Reports 7 (1943): 26. This listing omits those who served with
other wartime agencies such as the Office of Price Administration and the War Production
Board.
9The 1937-41 period was too brief for a significant body of NLRA law to develop. In
one significant case, however, the Supreme Court had held that strikes in breach of
contract would be unprotected by NLRA Section 7, but the Court assumed it had the
power to interpret the agreement. See NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 306 U.S. 332
(1939); Karl Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937- 1941," Minnesota Law Review 62 (1978): 303. The
union had sought JO enforce its interpretation of the agreement, announcing that em
ployees would not work unless this view was upheld. The Court interpreted the agreement
to favor the employer's contractual position; thus, the workers "were irrevocably com
mitted not to work in accordance with their contract" (306 U.S. at 344). Such a "re
pudiation" by employees of the agreement was deemed a severance of their employment.
The decision suggests that the Court would be no less hostile to self-help when an
arbitration procedure was present.
10]. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 21 U.S. 332 (1944).
�
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and certainly not on arbitration, except for its general encouragement of
collective bargaining. The administration and enforcement of collective
agreements were necessarily left to the vagaries of state l aw.
State courts, however, had initially encountered difficulty envisioning
collective bargaining agreements as enforceable contracts or unions as
proper vindicators of employment rights. Although some courts began
to enforce agreements against employers in the 1920s and 1 930s, belat
edly paralleling the traditional willingness to enjoin breaches of contract
by unions or to enjoin strikes, promises to arbitrate were not enforceable
in most states. 1 1 Since the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1 947,
however, one of the most creative and vital areas of federal labor policy
has concerned the contractual relationship of employers and unions, and
the views of the judiciary have been profoundly affected by the writings
of the pluralists. Section 301 of this statute permits unions and employers,
and employees as well, to bring actions in federal court to enforce col
lective agreements. To find the statute constitutional, the Supreme Court
was moved to hold that federal courts were empowered to create sub
stantive l aw, that is, judicially created policies that would define the
nature of "mature" collective bargaining agreements, their methods of
enforcement, and the remedies for breach.12
At the same time, the War Labor Board would adopt a restrictive view
of the scope of mandatory bargaining, that is, the subjects upon which
employers were legally compelled to bargain. Although the postwar Na
tional Labor Relations Board would adopt a less limited view of such
bargaining, the notion that a vague zone of managerial exclusivity existed
stems from several key War Labor Board decisions.
THE WAR L A B O R B O A R D

American entry into the war made necessary a major expansion of the
federal role in labor-management relations. Six days after the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued a call for a conference
of representatives of labor and management. In issuing the proclamation
convening the conference, the president declared that he desired speed,
1 1 See, generally, James Atleson, "The Circle of Boys Market: A Comment on Judicial
Inventiveness," Industrial Relations Law Journal 7 (19 85): 88; Katherine Stone, "The
Post-war Paradigm," 1518-21.
12Federal courts under Article 2 of the Constitution only h ave authority to enforce rights
under federal statutes and the Constitution. Generally, federal courts cannot be given
jurisdiction to enforce rights th at do not arise from th ese sources.
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a complete agreement that all wartime disputes would be settled peace
fully, and a no-strike pledge.13 The conference responded by recom
mending the creation of a war labor board having jurisdiction over all
issues, although no agreement was reached on the politically charged
union security issue.14
Union leaders independently acted to grant no-strike promises. Im
mediately after Pearl Harbor, for instance, William Green called a special
session of the American Federation of Labor's executive council, which
determined "that a 'no-strike' policy shall be applied in all war and
defense material production industries." A meeting of representatives
from all the AFL unions endorsed the statement, urging that no repressive
legislation should be passed and, ironically, that the right to strike as a
last resort weapon be safeguarded. Similarly, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations pledged its assistance in achieving "all-out production for
the national defense," but cautioned that it would defend the "material
interests of the working people and their democratic rights."15 Theoret
ically a voluntary surrender of labor's most important right, the no-strike
pledge was deemed compulsory by the government, even for unions that
were not represented at the 1 94 1 labor-management conference.1 6
The National War Labor Board was formally created on 12 January
1942, in a tersely worded Executive Order 9017.17 The board was to be
composed of twelve members, of whom four each would represent re
spectively labor, management, and the public. William Davis, the former
chair of the National Defense Mediation Board, was named chair of the
National War Labor Board. The other public members were George W.
Taylor, Frank P. Graham, and Wayne L. Morse.
If a dispute threatened to interrupt work related to war production,
u Fred Witney, Wartime Experiences of the National Labor Relations Board (Urbana:
University of Illinois Pre ss, 1949), 1 18.
14The president accepted the conference's agreement and short-circuited the i ssue by in
terpre ting the conference report as meaning that "all disputes," including the union shop
. controversy, were within the juri sdiction of the National War Labor Board. Witney,
Wartime Experiences of the National Labor Relations Board, 1 18-19; Joel Seidman,
American Labor from Defense to Reconversion (Chicago: University of Chi cago Press,
1953), 80-8 1.
15 CIO News, 15 Dece mbe r 1941; Seidman, American Labor from Defense to Reconversion,
78-79.
16Harris, The Right to Manage, 47. According to Martin Glaberman, no union consulte d
its me mbership in advance or after. M. Glaberman, Wartime Strikes: The Struggle against
the No-Strike Pledge in the UAW During World War II (De troit: Bewick Editions, 1980),
4-5.
17See NWLB Termination Report 2:49.
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the Department of Labor could certify the case to the War Labor Board

if it could not be resolved by its own conciliation service. 1 8 Once the
board assumed jurisdiction, its powers were all-encompassing. The board
was empowered to reach a final settlement of any labor dispute that
might interrupt work that "contributes to the effective prosecution of
the war." Unlike the National Labor Relations Board, the War Labor
Board's responsibility extended to the actual settlement of disputes by
"mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitration." Under the 1 943 War
Labor Disputes Act, for instance, the War Labor Board had the power
"to decide the dispute and provide by order the wages and hours and all
other terms and conditions (customarily included in collective bargaining
agreements) governing the relations between the parties" and to "provide
for terms and conditions to govern relations between the parties which
are to be fair and equitable between an employer and an employee under
all the circumstances of the case." 19
Thus, the National War Labor Board largely determined the wartime
terms of employment in American industry. In its first three years, the
WLB decided fourteen thousand dispute cases, affecting a majority of
the organized workers in the country. There were twenty-five occasions
when government seizure was invoked to enforce compliance. In thirty
one cases, the board called on the president for enforcement action;
seventeen involved union defiance and fourteen employer refusal. In four
cases, the workers backed down; in one, the employer retreated before
the president acted.20 Not only was a firm foundation created for the
CIO, but wartime regulation had permanent consequences for mass pro
duction unionism. As historian Nelson Lichtenstein has noted, "It was
the specific social and political context of World War II that created the
institutional framework for the kind of collective bargaining that evolved
in the decade or so after the war."21 The National War Labor Board
helped in setting industry-wide wage patterns, legitimized fringe-benefit
bargaining, encouraged arbitration as a method of resolving contractual
disputes, and influenced the internal structure and role of new unions,
primarily through the grant of union security clauses.
18Executive Order 9017, 3 C.F.R. 1 075 (1938-43 compil ation) .
19Public Law No. 89, 59 Stat. 163 (1943). The statute was commonly referred to as th e
Smith-Connally Act.
20See Aaron Levenstein, Labor Today and Tomorrow (New York: A. Knopf, 1946), 53,
102.
2 1 Nelson Lichtenstein, " Industrial Democracy, Contract Unionism and the National War
Labor Board," Labor Law Journal (August 1982): 524.
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World War II required unprecedented efforts to maintain and stimulate
production. The War Labor Board believed:
Maximum production during the war is a duty; the duty is not discharged when
production is impaired by lowered morale or strikes caused by the failure to
settle grievances. The duty to achieve and maintain production implies, therefore,
the establishment of grievance procedures and the prompt settlement of grievances
according to that procedure.22

Labor arbitration, backed by federal support, required stable unions,
both to effectuate such procedures and to contain rank-and-file militance.
World War II, therefore, provided a rational basis for stressing bureau
cratic dispute resolution, the restriction of midterm strikes, and union
control over rank-and-file action. More broadly, the war itself affected
the way Americans viewed labor, and those images remained after the
war. After the emergency ended, the "needs of the peacetime economy"
replaced the requirements of war, and federal policy continued to be
based upon increased and continuous production and the stability of
labor relations as well as unions.
The underlying themes of contemporary law were not, of course,
exclusively created in wartime, for many of the underlying values in
American labor law long predate federal statutes.23 The war, however,
helped to create, encourage, or cement visions of the proper labor
management system and the appropriate role of the state. The War Labor
Board helped advance a definition of industrial democracy exclusively in
process terms-outcomes or fairness were to be irrelevant. Postwar labor
law has proceeded in a similar fashion.24 In addition, the Supreme Court
in the postwar period has, like the War Labor Board, repeatedly dem
onstrated its opposition to collective action or self-help in the resolution
of labor disputes.25 This concern is especially reflected in cases where
"private" and "peaceful" avenues of resolution, such as arbitration, exist.
The result is a set of rules that protects the "integrity" of arbitration,
permitting the institution to carry out federal policy and making the
22"lnstructions to Regional War Labor Boards: Importance of Grievance Machinery," War
Labor Reports 9 (1944): 24-25 (National War Labor Board Memorandum Release,
issued 24 July 1943).
23See, generally, James Atl eson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1983).
24Karl Kl are, "Labor Law and Liberal Political Imagination," in David Kairys, ed., The
Politics of Law (New York: Pantheon, 1982), 60-61 .
25lbid., 5 1 ; Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law, chapter 3.
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intentions of parties less important than the language of contractualism
might initially suggest.
THE WAR LAB O R B OA R D A N D
THE P O STWAR LAW OF A RB ITRATI O N

Although grievance procedures and arbitration clauses were included in
some prewar collective bargaining agreements,26 and may well have flour
ished even without the strong encouragement of the War Labor Board,
"it was left to the War Labor Board to convince American industry and
labor that here was an indispensable tool to 'make collective bargaining
work.' "27 As the WLB Termination Report put it in 1 947:
The basis for the national war labor policy in America today is still the voluntary
agreement between the responsible leaders of labor and industry that there be
no strikes or lockouts for the duration of the war. All labor disputes, including
grievances, therefore, must be settled by peaceful means.28

The War Labor Board stressed the indispensable value of this dispute
resolution process, refined its structure and scope, forced the system on
unwilling employers, and provided rules for legal enforcement that would
eventually be adopted by the Supreme Court almost twenty years later.
Even without government encouragement, grievance procedures pro
vided advantages for unions and employers. Although employers gen
erally resisted arbitration both before and during the war, arbitral systems
provided an orderly means to resolve contractual disputes, discouraging
strikes or other job actions, and they also served to enforce a system of
rules for both employees and managerial personnel. A system of rules
was important for unions as well because emp1oyees have historically
objected to arbitrary supervisory behavior. Unions also found it valuable
to have a means that avoided the constant need to consider strikes over
every dispute. As Sidney Lens so persuasively argued forty years ago,
arbitration procedures were not necessarily reflective of a loss of union
power. Unions could not strike over every dispute, and a grievance pro26Sylvester Garrett, "Resolving the Tension: Arbitration Confronts theExternal Legal Sys
tem," Case Western Reserve Law Review 39 (1988-89 ) : 557; Dennis Nolan and Roger
Abrams, "American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years," University of Florida Law
Review 35 ( 19 83} : 575- 77.
27Paul Fisher, "The National War Labor Board and Post- War Industrial Relations," Quar
terly Journal of Economics 59 (August 1945} : 505. See also, Benjamin Aaron, "Catalyst:
The National War Labor Board of World War II," Case Western Reserve Law Review
39 ( 19 8 8-89} : 519 .
28NWLB Termination Report 1 (1947} : 65.
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cedure offered a n "opportunity for realignment o f forces, for fencing,
minor skirmishing, for strengthening of positions. " A well-operating and
effective grievance procedure, therefore, continued membership support
during the life of a contract. "The grievance prqcedure in actual practice
is used as a weapon . . . as a way to muster strength for class warfare. "29
The existence of arbitration procedures also could shield union leadership
from the constant pressure to take or support workplace action, a con
sideration that helped explain the support for arbitration by unions such
as the UAW even before the war.
Grievance procedures also tend to centralize dispute resolution in the
union hierarchy, not in the affected work group, and the union generally
controls the decision to initiate grievances and how far to pursue them.30
Indeed, the multitiered grievance process exactly mirrors the hierarchies
of both employer and union. Unions, however, defended institutional
control as democratic because the representative of the employees con
trolled the dispute, and arbitration would serve as a judicial-like restraint
upon managerial excess. This argument nicely meshes with the view of
industrial democracy held by the War Labor Board and the postwar
Supreme Court, focusing less on worker participation and influence than
on routine and peaceful processing of grievances.3 1 Notions of hierarchy
and control were embedded in this view of industrial democracy, since,
given the policies of international officials, independent rank-and-file
action or wildcat strikes could be seen as undemocratic.32
It is difficult to plot precisely the development of the War Labor
Board's views on arbitration, and perhaps it is misleading to try to ra
tionalize its actions based upon the random flow of cases. From the
beginning, the board set up arbitration panels to decide specific cases,
generally appointing the arbitrator.33 Early decisions merely encouraged
29Sidney Lens, "Meaning of the Grievance Procedure," Harvard Business Review 26 (1948):
713.
30The board permitted individuals to file grievances at the first step, but after th at, the
union was to participate in the settlement. NWLB Termination Report 1 : 1 13-45.
31Thus, as Nelson Lichtenstein notes, the United Steelworkers of America would be called
"democratic" by the War Labor Board despite its top-down form of organization, pri
marily because it was cooperativ� with the policies of the administration. Nelson Lich
tenstein, Labor's War at Home (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1 8 1 .
32The board sometimes instructed international officials to investigate local officials and
impose fines on wildcatters. Chrysler Corp., War Labor Reports 10 (1943): 553. See
also, Lichtenstein, Labor's War at Home, 180-82.
33 See, for ex ample, New York Telephone Co. War Labor Reports 1 (1942): 259; Willamette
Valley Lumber Operators, 1 War Labor Reports 151 (1942); Steel Drop Forge Group,
War Labor Reports 1 (1942): 22.
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the parties to accept voluntarily arbitration clauses for future disputes.34
Unions that had voluntarily surrendered the right to strike had an es
pecially critical need to find a means to hold employers to their promises
and, after 1 943 , the board often imposed arbitration clauses35 because
outsiders would decide matters within the proper control of management.
The board's public members noted that "grievance procedures without
eventual arbitration is a one-sided affair." The absence of arbitration
systems "does not assure the employees of any settlement except on the
company's terms and in that respect it invites labor trouble."36
The structure of arbitration advocated by the War Labor Board
strongly resembled arbitral systems established in the hosiery and clothing
industry by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers union in the 1 920s.
George W. Taylor, the vice-chair of the War Labor Board, had been
heavily influenced by the experience of the needle trades. 37 In a chronically
unstable industry, the union and larger manufacturers strove to control
the anarchy caused by both the market and the mass of small entrepre
neurs by instituting procedures that would permit advanced planning.
The hosiery experience was influential in a variety of ways. For instance,
a General Motors representative observed hosiery arbitrations prior to
the creation of the General Motors-United Automobile Workers arbitral
arrangement. General Motors, however, insisted upon a more restrictive
umpireship, in which decisions were to be based upon evidence submitted
in a formal hearing and on the basis of contractual language. Its first
umpire in 1 94 1 was George Taylor. Thus, Taylor had experience with
both the more fluid hosiery system and the more legalistic process in the
auto industry.
The War Labor Board's own experience served to confirm the value
of arbitration, and the situation at Chrysler, where arbitration was im
posed upon a vigorous shop steward system, is instructive. At Chrysler's
Dodge Main plant in Detroit, the very first collective agreement provided
that both the elected plantwide bargaining committee and the chief stew
ards could confer with foremen or other management representatives
34Acmeline Manufacturing Co. , War Labor Reports 9 (1943): 524.
35Chrysler Corp., War Labor Reports 10 (1943): 55 1 ; Champlin Refining Co., War Labor
Reports 3 (1942): 155; Nolan and Abrams, "American Labor Arbitration: The Maturi ng
Years," 571-73; Lichtenstein, "Industrial Democr acy, Contract Unionism and the Na
tional War Labor Board," 524.
36Nil es-Bement-Pond Co., War Labor Reports 5 (1943): 489.
37 From 1931-41 Taylor served as the second impartial chair of the Full- Fashioned Hosiery
Manufactur es and the American Federation of Hosiery Workers, and in 1934, became
the chair of the Philadelphia Men's Clothing Arbitration Board.
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during working hours. As historian Steve Jefferys notes, the agreement
provided for "two parallel systems of plant bargaining."38 After a crucial
45-day strike in 1 939, Local 3 altered its constitution, establishing the
"primacy of the steward over the plant committee on departmental is
sues" and rank-and-file control over the chief shop steward. Deputy
stewards were to be provided for every twenty employees. What is most
fascinating about this development is that it occurred solely within the
union's own internal legal system and not via collective bargaining.
By 1943, many activists at Dodge Main, as at many other industrial
plants, had been dispersed to other locations or to the armed services;
but a core remained, one sufficient to instruct the newly hired war
workers on issues of job control. Like other companies in 1943, Chrysler
attempted to tighten workplace discipline, refusing to deal with stewards
and referring issues to the seriously backlogged War Labor Board. A
walkout followed by firings led to a widespread sympathy strike in all
of Chrysler's Detroit plants, at the very moment when the War Labor
Board was holding hearings on the failure of the UAW and Chrysler
to reach a new agreement. The board viewed its duty as resolving "the
problems of which the industrial unrest is a symptom," noting that
there had been sixty-six strikes at Chrysler between 23 December 1941
and 8 January 1943. To that end, the board insisted on an arbitration
procedure similar to the system created at General Motors in 1 940 and
at Ford in 1 94 1 . At both firms, the UAW had advocated a grievance
procedure that terminated in final arbitration by a permanent arbitrator
or umpire. The existing grievance procedure involved a board consisting
of two representatives of labor and management. The grievance would
remain unresolved should the parties fail to agree, a system the board
viewed as "obsolete." Instead, the board appointed an "impartial chair
man."39 The board's action in Chrysler, therefore, meshed with national
UAW policy.
Within a year of the board's creation, the basic contours and rules of
labor arbitration were established. Decisions in 1 943 reflected the board's
support for a formalized, multistep grievance process that would ulti
mately end in adjudication by a neutral arbitrator, a pattern that has
38Steve Jefferys, Management and Managed: Fifty Years of Crisis at Chrysler (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 74-75.
39Chrysler Corp., War Labor Reports 10 (1943): 551. In 1942 the board had refused to
order arbitration of new wage rates, although it did app rove arbitration of differential
rates paid to men and women p erforming comp arable work. Chrysler Corp ., War Labor
Reports 3 (1942): 447.
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long since become commonplace.40 The Supreme Court in the 1 960s
would adopt the basic design set by the War Labor Board, albeit without
attribution.41 The War Labor Board's structure of rules, although ex
plainable by wartime exigencies, would also be consistent with the themes
of industrial pluralism in the postwar period. More broadly, these themes
were congruent with contractualist notions long present in American legal
thought. Thus, for instance, the jurisdiction of the arbitrator would be
restricted to the settlement of questions concerning the interpretation or
application of the terms of collective bargaining agreements.42 Arbitration
fit a voluntarist, contractual model of industrial relations in which dis
putes could be settled without apparent government involvement.43
The contractualist vision extended beyond the scope of arbitration. If
the parties had an arbitration agreement, for instance, the War Labor
Board would order arbitration despite an employer objection that the
grievance lacked merit.44 Moreover, once an award was rendered, the
board held that "every reasonable presumption is made in favor of such
an award," and that awards would be upheld if there was no proof "of
fraud, misconduct or other equally valid objection."45 Thus the refusal
to comply with an award was treated as a refusal to comply with an
order of the War Labor Board.46 Moreover, the War Labor Board af
firmed arbitration awards despite an employer's contention that com
pliance would not be "in the interests of full production." As the board
noted in one decision, "labor and industry generally throughout the
country have come to regard arbitration as the wisest, fairest, and speed
iest method of settling industrial disputes, especially during wartime."47
40See, for ex ample, Eclipse Fuel Engineering Co., War Labor Reports 6 (1943): 279.
4 1 By 1960, the date of the Supre me Court 's t ri logy, arbit ration clauses were found in ove r
90 percent of collective agree ments. BLS Bull. No. 1425-1, "Grievance Procedures"
(1964),1. The Supreme Court may have wished to support the arbitration process, but
the War Labor Board had already accomplishe d that re sult ove r fifteen years e arlier.
42Chrysler Corp., War Labor Reports 3 (1942): 447; War Labor Reports 10 ( 1943) : 551.
43See, for example, NWLB Termination Report 1 : 131; Realt y Advisory Board, War Labor
Reports 2 (1942): 1 83 .
44Texoma Nat ural Gas Co., War Labor Reports 10 (1943): 438.
45See Sullivan Drydock and Repair Co., War Labor Reports 6 (1943): 467; Smith and
Wesson, War Labor Reports 10 (1943): 148, 153; Termination Report 1:404-5. The
board would re fuse t o review an award even though the arbit ration agreement stipulated
that either part y could appe al to the WLB. Sullivan Drydock and Re pair Co., War Labor
Reports 6 (1943): 467. See also, "Statement of Policy Conce rning Review of Arbitration
Awards," Termination Report 2:694.
46Termination Report 1 :41 1-12, 2:694-95.
47Alex ander Milburn Co., War Labor Reports 5 (1942): 529.
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This broad protection o f arbitration awards would also b e reflected i n
the Supreme Court's postwar jurisprudence.48
The state courts had generally been hostile to arbitral arrangements,
apparently because they viewed arbitration as a threat to supplant the
courts.49 Many, therefore, refused to enforce such promises. Breaking
from the common law view, the War Labor Board held that parties to
an arbitration agreement must live up to their promises to arbitrate, and
the board would enforce such awards. 5° In addition, the determinations
of the War Labor Board would not be affected by any arbitration laws
that might exist in various states. 5 1 Subsequently, the Supreme Court
would also determine that collective bargaining law was exclusively fed
eral, thereby preempting contrary state statutes and rules.
Despite the board's protection of arbitral systems, some revealing
limitations were recognized, perhaps because of managerial concern that
arbitrators would h ave "the final decision on all matters which the union
. may want to treat as grievances."52 The board made clear in 1 942 that
arbitration would not involve matters of "managerial prerogative."53 In
48In the famous arbitration trilogy of 1960, the Supreme Court held that courts should
apply broad presumptions of coverage when questions arise about the scope of arbitration
clauses and, second, that arbitration awards should be presumed valid unless their "words
manifest an infidelity to the agreement." The arbitr ation trilogy involves th ree Supreme
Court decisions decided on the same day in which the United Steelworkers successfully
achieved broad protections for arbitration: United Steelworkers of America v. American
Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). These conclusions not only
mirrored the decisions of the War Labor Board, but they also flowed directly from concern
by pluralists that courts would unduly en mesh themselves in the private dispute-resolution
process unless they deferred to arbitration procedures.
These decisions made clear that arbitration was to be the primary vehicle for the
resolution of industrial disputes involving the interpretation or application of collective
bargaining agreements. In line with pluralist precepts, the courts would support the
grievance and arbitration process while concurr ently trying not to interfere with it, since
the collective bargaining system was viewed as a form of private self-government. The
emph asis upon enforcing the intentions of the parties masks the att empt to "civilize"
industrial relations and restrain "jungle warfare."
49See, for example, GatliffCoal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. 2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944); Charles Gregory
and Rich ard Orlikoff, "The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements," University
of Chicago Law Review 17 (1950): 233.
50See, for example, Smith and Wesson, War Labor Reports 10 (1943): 148. See, generally,
Jessie Freidin and Francis J. Ulman, "Arbitration and the War Labor Board," Harvard
Law Review 58 (1945): 3 15.
51fbid.
52 Montgomery Ward and Co., War Labor Reports 10 (1943 ) : 415, 420.
53 See, for example, Atlas Power Co., War Labor Reports 5 (1942): 371. (Denial of extension
of arbitration to cover transfer and promotion disputes where h azardous nature of op·
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the highly publicized Montgomery Ward decision in 1 942 in which man
agement prerogatives were an issue, the board ordered a contractual
definition of a "grievance" that would exclude "changes in business
practice, the opening and closing of new units, the choice of personnel
(subject, however, to the seniority provision), the choice of merchandise
to be sold, or other business questions of a like nature not having to do
directly and primarily with the day-to-day life of the employees and their
relations with supervisors."54
Managerial authority was also recognized in areas clearly within arbi
tral jurisdiction. The board had no difficulty in holding that disciplinary
matters were subject to arbitration, especially given the high incidence of
clauses in collective bargaining agreements preventing discipline or dis
charge without "just cause." But the board nevertheless strongly sup
ported management's

authority to take prompt action, including

suspending or removing an employee from a job pending investigation or a
hearing, subject to the right of the employee or the union to grieve. As War
Labor Board public members Jesse Freidin and Francis Ulman confidently
stated in 1 945, "Arrangements have never been directed whereby the
union's approval must be secured before discipline can be meted out." In
deed, the authors noted that a contractual requirement of union approval
had existed at Brewster Aeronautical Corporation, but it was "changed by
the parties in conferences in which a Board representative participated, so
as to restore to management its initial power to discipline. The Board ap
proved the changes. "55 Thus, the now common notion that the employer
acts and the employee or union can only grieve is not so much designed to
avoid the possibility that employees will otherwise engage in self-help or
because it is a necessary requirement of the grievance process as would be
argued after the war. Instead, it is based upon the board's assumption that
such a concept was an incident of managerial prerogative protecting hier
archy and aiding continued production. 56
Yale Law School's H arry Shulman helped propound these views in a
most forceful manner.57 Shulman, who became umpire for the Ford Moerations necessitates complete control by company.) See al so, Harris, The Right to Man
age, 55-56.
54Montgomery Ward and Co., War Labor Reports 4 (1942): 277, 280.
55Freidin and Ulman, "Arbitration and the War Labor Boar d," 355-56.
56See, for instance, Brewster Aeronautical Corp., War Labor Reports 12 (1943): 40; Norge
Machine Products Division of Borg-Warner Corp., War Labor Reports 15 (1944) : 65 1 ;
Briggs Manufacturing Co., War Labor Reports 5 (1942): 340.
57 Harry Shulman's 1955 Holmes lecture, "Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations,"
was printed both in Harvard Law Review 68 (1955): 999, and Jean McKelvey, ed.,
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tor Company-UAW in 1 943, recognized the role o f law i n protecting
unions, but he stressed that the law left the conditions of work to the
"autonomous determination" of employers and unions.58 Like all the
pluralists, Shulman recognized that employment was a conflictual rela
tionship, a contention which must have been repeatedly highlighted by
the contentious labor relations at Ford; but he believed conflict should
be restricted due to the imperatives of production, and disputes "will be
adjusted by the application of reason guided by the light of the contract,
rather than by force or power."59 Strikes, an "integral part of the system
of collective bargaining," were referred to as a "cessation of production"
rather than as a refusal to work. Although Shulman believed that liti
gation was unsuited to the enforcement of agreements, he stressed that
it did not "follow that the alternative is jungle warfare" because
arbitration
is an integral part of the system of self government. And the system is designed
to aid management in its quest for efficiency, to assist union leadership in its
participation in the enterprise, and to secure justice for the employees. It is a
means of making collective bargaining work and thus preserving private enter
prise in a free government."0

Grievance procedures to Shulman were not only an "orderly, effective
and democratic way of adjusting such disputes," but the procedure also
represented the substitution of "civilized collective bargaining for jungle
warfare."6 1 The repeated reference to "jungle warfare" is instructive for
the notion apparently includes the concerted withdrawal of labor, the
basic right underlying the NLRA. Note that Shulman's argument is not
premised upon an explicit union promise to avoid strikes. Instead, the
very existence of an arbitration procedure foreclosed strikes over matters
that fell within the ambit of such clauses.
Shulman was the most influential arbitrator during the war and in the
immediate postwar period, but many of his most cited decisions were
reached in wartime. Thus, his statement that "while management and
Management Rights and the Arbitration Process, Procee dings of the Ninth Annual Meet
ing of the National Academy of Arbitrators (Washington, D.C.: BNA Inc., 1956), 169.
It is probably the most widely quoted article in the are a of arbitration and contract dispute
settlement.
58 Harry Shulman, " Re ason, Contract and Law in Labor Re lations," Harvard Law Review
68 (1955): 1000.
59Ibid., 1007.
60Ibid., 1024.
61 Opinions of the Umpire, Ford Motor Co. and UAW-CIO, 1 943-1 946, Case No. A-116.
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labor are in adverse bargaining positions, they are joint participants in
the productive effort," flows smoothly from wartime needs,62 as does his
comment that "maintenance of efficient production is of vital importance
. . . to the community as a whole."
In perhaps his most well-known award, issued in 1944, Shulman
stressed the requirement that employees follow the grievance procedure
instead of resorting to self-help. Such behavior was "essential in order
to avoid disruption of relations between the parties and anarchy in the
operation of the plant." In one of his most famous phrases, he argued
that an "industrial plant is not a debating society."63 This sentiment,
reflected in thousands of postwar arbitration awards, makes clear that
contract rights of unions will be treated differently from the assertion of
such rights by employers because "to refuse obedience because of a
claimed contract violation would be to substitute individual action for
collective bargaining and to replace the grievance procedure with extra
contractual methods." Self-help, therefore, was "extracontractual" where
a grievance procedure was in existence. "When a controversy arises,
production cannot wait for exhaustion of the grievance procedure. While
that procedure is pursued, production must go on."

A challenge to a

managerial order interferes with the "authority to direct work," which,
Shulman believed, is vested in supervision "because the responsibility for
production is also vested there; and responsibility must be accompanied
by authority." Shulman's concerns were not limited to enterprises run
for profit; instead, "any enterprise in a capitalist or socialist economy
requires persons of authority and responsibility to keep the enterprise
going."64
The argument that arbitration tames the often unruly rank and file
has been used both to criticize the institution and, by the postwar judi
ciary, to strengthen it. Few authorized strikes occurred during the war,
but workers demonstrated their power through the large number of wild
cat strikes that did occur. It is not at all clear that arbitration procedures
avert wildcat strikes, for arbitral resolution is not necessarily quick nor
does the process always involve the workers actually affected. Indeed,
the existence of arbitration and the War Labor Board seemed almost
irrelevant to most wildcat strikers, except to the extent that frustration
620pinions of the Umpire, Ford Motor Co. and UAW-CIO, 1 943-1 946, A-5 61 .
630pinions o f the Umpire, A-116; also published a s Matter o f Ford Motor Co., 3 LA 779
(1944) . See also, A-29.
640pinions of the Umpire, A-1 16.
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with War Labor Board delays and policies can be deemed to have been
the partial cause of some wartime stoppages. Regulators might have
believed in such a connection, however, and experience in the apparel
industry earlier in the century suggested that rank-and-file militance can
be moderated and, at least with time, replaced by a more bureaucratized
system of dispute resolution.65
Even on this question, however, there was a long and heated postwar
debate among arbitrators and labor scholars on the scope of the grievance
process. To most of the pluralists, and with perhaps George Taylor and
Harry Shulman in mind, arbitrators were believed to be superior to judges
because they could be less rigid, less rule-oriented, as well as more in
formed of the "practices, assumptions, understandings, and aspirations
of the going industrial concern. "66 Indeed, this confident view of the
arbitrator's role and ability was used by the Supreme Court in 1 960 to
explain its broad deference given to arbitration: "Even the ablest judge
cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear
upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed. "67
The job of the arbitrator, however, was to do more than simply search
for, or create, the "intentions of the parties." As Katherine Stone has
effectively demonstrated, the pluralist approach also was based upon the
assumption that arbitration can be used as part of a therapeutic effort
65Despite both contractual and le gal restrictions on the right to strike , h owever, wildcats
or strikes violating no-strike clause s have not disappeared. James At!eson, "Work Group
Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The Causes and Functions of Industrial Civil Disobedi
ence," Ohio State Law Journal 34 (1973): 750; Alvin Gouldner, Wildcat Strike (New
York: Harpe r and Row, 1954); George Sayles, "Wildcat Strikes," Harvard Business
Review 43 (1954): 42; James Kuhn, Bargaining in Grievance Settlement: The Power of
Industrial Work Groups (New Y ork: Columbia University Press, 1961).
This suggests that such activity cannot be fully suppressed by contract, institutional
pressure, or law. As David Brody has perceptively noted, the contractual re gime cannot
totally supplant the "core of informal shop-floor activity," but it does "narrow the scope
of such activity" and increasingly designates noncontractual activity and pre rogatives as
"extrale gal in character." Brody; Workers in Industrial America, 202.
66 Archibald Cox , "Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration," Harvard Law Review 72 (1959):
1500.
67United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). The
opposing view, state d most force fully by Professor Lon Fuller, was that the arbitrator
had no " roving commission to straigh ten things out." The assumptions that arbitrators
could "loosely" inte rpre t the agreement, Fulle r argued, could not be based upon any
generally assume d intent of the parties. Lon Fuller, "Collective Bargaining and the Ar
bitrator," in Mark Kahn, ed., Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator's Role, Procee dings
of the Fifteenth Annual Mee ting of the National Acade my of Arbitrators (Washington,
D.C.: BNA Inc., 1962), 8. See also, J. Noble Braden, "Problems in Labor Arbitration,"
Missouri Law Review 13 (1948): 143.
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to lessen underlying tensions and discontent at the workplace.68 It is
doubtful whether most arbitrators actually decide cases on the basis of
alleviating workplace tensions, but the assumption reveals the role ar
bitrators are theoretically to play in easing tensions, rather than simply
interpreting the agreement. The War Labor Board, however, had more
immediate concerns, and its arbitration and union security policies were
basically in place before the wildcat strike wave of 1 943 and 1 944.
Moreover, the board's common grant of arbitration clauses was not
simply based upon the need to find a peaceful and effective means to
resolve workplace conflicts but also to find a fair method to settle conflict
in a situation in which unions had surrendered the right to strike. 69
By war's end, the basic structure of today' s common arbitral system
was in place. Typically, contracts called for a multistep grievance process
that had the effect of transferring authority from shop-floor leaders to
the union hierarchy. Rights were no longer to be based upon tradition
or custom but upon the contract and arbitral case law, a process thought
to parallel the "rule of law" in society. Discharge or discipline could only
be for "just cause," but supervisory orders had to be obeyed, that is, the
grievance system would substitute for self-help. Such a process requires
patience over militancy, substituting third-party resolution for the ex
ercise of shop-floor power.70
Wayne Morse, one of the four public members of the War Labor
Board, strongly believed the board should not resolve disputes while a
strike was in progress. Previously dean of the Oregon Law School, Morse
had extensive arbitral experience on the West Coast prior to joining the
War Labor Board. Experience in the "bare-knuckle environment" of
longshoring, said former WLB member Lewis Gill, "had doubtless con
vinced him that only a firm grip by the arbitrator, in a strictly judicial
proceeding, could insure a reasonably orderly and workable modus op68 Stone, "The Post-war Paradigm," 1559-73.
69Caterpillar Tractor Co., War Labor Reports 2 (1942): 75; Borg-Warner Corp., War
Labor Reports 6 (1943): 233. An arbitration clause was imposed in one case where the
prewar agreement contained a no-strike clause. Thirteen Jobbing Machine Shops, War
Labor Reports 2 (1942): 423.
70The board's policies fostering the routinization of workplace disputes combined by late
1943 with a managerial counterattack on union power in the workplace. For a description
of the centralization and bureaucratization of disciplinary power at Ford's Rouge plant,
see Nelson Lichtenstein, "Life at the Rouge: A Cycle of Workers' Control," in Charles
Stephenson and Robert Asher, eds., Life and Labor: Dimensions of American Working
Class History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 248-5 1 .
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erandi.'m As Morse stated in a 1 944 law review article, "the effective
prosecution of the war cannot wait until the leisure of the party liti
gants. "72 More broadly, the board would insist that strikes we're improper
even while disputes were being processed through the contractual griev
ance system. This notion would find favor long after, both in the Supreme
Court and in arbitral decisions barring self-help where grievance systems
existed.
Collective bargaining and the arbitration process were also thought
to require a different kind of union leader. Golden and Ruttenberg noted
in 1942 that "most militant local union leaders, who rise to the surface
in the organizing stage of unions, fall by the side when the union moves
into the state of constructive relations with management.''73 "Construc
tive" labor relations, therefore, requires responsible unions led by "co
operative" leaders. 74
In addition to the supposed need to alter the kind of leaders needed,
bargaining and arbitration tend to change the issues to be decided. A
grievance process transforms disputes, which could be based upon con
cerns for personal integrity or moral and political issues, into narrower,
more legalistic questions. 75 Indeed, over time, disputes become contrac
tual or else they are improper. For as rights become more clearly based
solely upon the contract, disputes over other matters are treated as ir
relevant, unimportant or, at least, unjustifiable.
The move from a system of workplace confrontation to higher-level
bargaining or arbitration, therefore, may alter the substance of bargain
ing, that is, the nature of the issues. Workplace conflict tended to deal

71 Lewis Gill, "The Nature of Arbitration: The Blurred Line Between Mediatory and Judicial
Arbitration Proceedings," Case Western Reserve Law Review 39 (1988-89): 546.
72Wayne Morse, "The National War Labor Board Puts Labor Law Theory into Action,"
Iowa Law Review 19 (1944): 1 8 1 ; Lee Wilkins, Wayne Morse: A Bio-Bibliography
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985), 14-18.
73Clinton Golden and Harold Ruttenberg, The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), 58. In Richard Lester's words, the successors of the
founding leaders of a union tend to be not "crusading agitator[s]," but the "skillful
political operator and level-headed administrator." Richard Lester, As Unions Mature
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 26.
74Although nonmilitant, "constructive" union officials were not the exclusive type of leader,
but the pattern described does seem to parallel some revolutions in which militant
leaders are forced out, killed, or shipped abroad to be replaced by more managerial,
bureaucratic types.
75Lynn Mather and Barbara Yngvesson, "Language, Audience, and the Transformation of
Disputes," Law and Society Review 15 (1981): 775.
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with speed of production, discipline, or actions of foremen.76 "Mature"
collective bargaining, on the other hand, often deals with other issues.
Thus, a change in focus of concern, in the definition of what is important,
occurred, rather than simply a change in the location of and participants
in dispute resolution. Although unions of the 1 940s often declared their
intention to invade hitherto sacred management preserves, and employers
seemed to have believed that such threats were real,77 the labor movement
primarily sought involvement in major capital decisions, not the types
of workplace issues that often seem of greater immediacy to workers.
Nevertheless, the combination of legal restrictions on the scope of bar
gaining and the protection of arbitration tended to deprive workers of
influence on both capital decisions and workplace conflicts.

M A N A G E R I A L P R E R O GATIVES :
C OL LECTIVE B A R G A I N I N G ' S F O RB I D D E N Z O N E

At the end of the war, the primary fear of American employers was the
union challenge to managerial control of the workplace. Executives fo
cused this concern less upon strikes than upon "the serious and lasting
limitations on their freedom of action resulting from the orderly collective
bargaining achievements of bureaucratic unionism, assisted by the orders
of arbitrators and the NWLB.'m Managerial fears, however, must have
been based primarily upon union bargaining power and workplace pres
sures because the wartime "law" was certainly sympathetic toward man
agerial prerogatives. 79
76 "Reported Work Stoppages in Automobile Plants in Dec. 1944, Jan., Feb. 1945," set out
in Glaberman, Wartime Strikes, 51-60.
-----77Harris, The Right to Manage. Although unions seemed to de-emphasize such attempted
incursions during the 1945-49 period, there were economic reasons for such behavior.
The primary concern of unions during this period was job security and the protection
against raging inflation concurrent with a vigorous managerial counterattack. See David
Brody, Workers in Industrial America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 173214.
78 Harris, The Right to Manage, 67. For an argument that managers had lost considerable
power during the war years, see Robert M. C. Littler, "Managers Must Manage," Harvard
Business Review 24 (1946): 366.
79Despite the wartime statements by some union officials expressing their interest in further
influence in management, statements by unionists supporting the concept of managerial
rights could also be found. Thus, Philip Murray and Morris Cooke stated in 1940: "To
relieve the boss or the management of proper responsibility for making a success of the
enterprise is about the last thing any group of employees-organized or unorganized
would consider workable or even desirable. The Unions are on record in numerous
instances as recognizing that in the last analysis management has to manage, if any concern
is to be a success financially or in any other way." Philip Murray and Morris Cooke,
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The first National Labor Relations Board, created by executive order
in 1 934, had endorsed a broad reading of the duty to bargain, expanding
interpretations from its predecessor, the National Labor Board. Em
ployers had been ordered to bargain over a wide range of matters that
had an impact on terms and conditions of employment, including changes
in terms occasioned by plant relocation or the introduction of a new line
of products.80 Despite this history, the War Labor Board at an early date
recognized an area of decision making it designated as "managerial pre
rogatives." The determination that a matter is solely a management func
tion means, first, that the employer need not bargain about such a matter
despite the union's request that it do so, nor would the War Labor Board
restrict managerial authority in these areas. Second, and often most im
portant, an employer may initiate action in these areas without first
bargaining with the union and without subsequent arbitral challenge.
Although the scope of bargaining would be a vital question under the
NLRA, little litigation under that statute had occurred on these questions
between the determination that the NLRA was constitutional in 1 93 7
and the outbreak of war.81 Thus, the War Labor Board's assumptions
would become deeply embedded in NLRA jurisprudence after the war.82
In 1 946, Ludwig Teller, prolific writer of labor law articles and trea
tises, was pleased to report that "the decisions of the War Labor Board
in labor dispute cases did much to reinstate management confidence in
business continuity, in the right to initiate business decisions."83 Teller
argued that when the war and the War Labor Board ended, there was
"increasing reliance" on the decisions of the War Labor Board "because
of the belief that its decisions are a source of guidance for desirable
practices in the field of labor relations." As Teller perceptively noted in
1946, the War Labor Board's "decisions are the beginnings of a labor
jurisprudence." Indeed, it is the War Labor Board, not the National Labor
Relations Board, that institutionalized the notion that the scope of man
datory bargaining is restricted by certain inherent managerial rights.
When faced with a dispute over the terms of the collective bargaining
Organized Labor and Production (New York: Harper, 1940), 84. As David Montgomery
and Howell Harris demonstrate in this volume, labor's lack of desire "to manage,or to
interfere in the least with the employee's affairs" is longstanding.
80 Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law, 1 18.
"'Ibid., 1 15-22.
82See, generally, Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law.
83Ludwig Teller, "The War Labor Board and Management Functions," NYU Law Quar
terly Review 21 (1946): 365.
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agreement, the board might be required to write much or all of the
agreement for the parties. The board might be faced with a dispute
concerning a right asserted by the employer or a practice that either the
employer or the union wanted established or terminated. In either case,
employers often contended that the exercise of a particular right should
be or remain part of the employer's "reserved rights." These asserted
"managerial prerogatives" often involved production matters as well as
union proposals for health insurance, company-financed unemployment
funds, sick leave, and medical, hospital, pregnancy, and maternity
benefits.
The War Labor Board tended to be keenly protective of managerial
rights, and it routinely denied union welfare proposals. The War Labor
Board, it was said, was "hesitant about breaking new ground. "84 The
War Labor Board, however, did grant unions a measure of participation
in many matters previously thought to be exclusively managerial. For
instance, the board supported automatic wage progression plans that
affected employers' control of labor costs and the work force. In addition,
board-ordered job classification plans and other work arrangements gave
unions the right to be consulted in both the creation and the adminis
tration of such schemes.85 Nevertheless, what is noteworthy about the
board's rulings is the lack of any felt need to explain the nature or scope,
or to even justify the existence, of managerial prerogatives. 86
The board's clearest statement of its approach is probably to be found
in its Montgomery Ward decision. Management functions were excluded
from arbitration to the extent that they related to:
changes in the general business practice, the opening or closing of new units, the
choice of personnel, the choice of merchandise to be sold, or other business
questions of a like nature not having to do directly and primarily with the day
to-day life of the employees and their relations with their supervisors. 87

The scope of bargaining, therefore, was to be narrowed to the "day-to
day" concerns of employees. As under the National Labor Relations Act,
84Constance Williams, "Note on Management Prerogatives," NWLB Termination Report
2:623.
85Timothy Willard, "Labor and the National War Labor Board 1942-1945: An Experiment
in Corporatist Wage Stabilization" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toledo, 1984), 40.
86"0ne of the most remarkable features of the War Labor Board cases dealing with man
agement functions is the failure to define at length the meaning of management function
in a union relationship, or even to discuss its essential qualities as a guide to future
policies." Teller, "The War Labor Board and Management Functions," 365.
87Montgomery Ward, War Labor Reports 10 (1943): 415.
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it is the challenge to the employer's control of production and the state's
unwillingness to sanction such challenges that seem to underlie these
cases.
A good deal of labor's creativity in creating bargaining proposals arose
from the fact that possible wage gains were strictly controlled by the
board's Little Steel formula. Even matters clearly involving working con
ditions, however, were often avoided by the board. The board would not
always explicitly rule that particular issues were improper subjects for
bargaining; instead, the War Labor Board often sent such issues back to
the parties for further negotiation, a resolution with foreseeable results
given the no-strike pledge. As Aaron Levenstein, a strong critic of the
WLB, noted:
[The board's] refusal to decide made it impossible for the unions to bargain on
those matters altogether. Since the strike weapon had been put in cold storage,
the issues remained an economic no man's land which the Board would not enter
and which labor could not invade because it had no persuasive power. In this
region of disputed issues, the employers' only obligation was to negotiate before
saying no.""

The unions argued that the no-strike pledge obliged the board to rule on
all issues. The "no-strike, no lockout agreement," they argued in vain,
was conditioned on the submission of "all disputes" to the board. The
board's position was essentially that its jurisdiction was narrower than
the no-strike promise. Effectively, then, the no-strike obligation was un
limited, but the right to bargain was not. 89
The United Auto Workers, for instance, demanded that General Mo
tors create an employee security fund equal to the one it had already put
aside for postwar business contingencies. The fund would purchase war
bonds and, after the war, it would supplement unemployment insurance
for workers who could not be provided with a forty-hour workweek.
The board agreed with General Motors that the union's demand was
essentially a "profit-sharing plan and is beyond the powers of the War
Labor Board to adjudicate."90 The public members of the board believed
88See Aaron Levenstein, Labor Today and Tomorrow (New York: A. Knopf, 1946), 102.
89Unions did broaden the scope of bargaining, however, despite the board's lack of support.
The UMW developed the concept of a royalty for every ton of coal min�d to be used to
create a fund for medical service, hospitalization, rehabilitation, and general economic
protection. Levenstein, Labor Today and Tomorrow, 103-4. Other unions like the In
ternational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union required employers to contribute to union
health and vacation funds.
90 General Motors Company, War Labor Reports 22 (1945): 484.
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they should prevent the introduction of "sociological innovations" during
the war. The powerful wartime interest in labor peace could have led to
a broad, inclusive reading of the scope of bargaining, especially given
the unions' no-strike pledge. Yet, the interest in co-option, or in the
institutionalization of dispute resolution, was apparently weaker than
the War Labor Board's preference for unrestricted managerial freedom
over certain matters.
In the War Labor Board's first decision in which the issue was raised,
Arcade Malleable Iron Co., the board denied an employer's request for
a clause that specifically listed various management functions. The
board's denial was accompanied with the statement that "adequate pro
tection is afforded the company by law and by the many decisions of the
courts and of other tribunals concerned with the question."9 1 Given the
paucity of

NLRA decisions dealing with the scope of bargaining, it is

difficult to know what body of law the board had in mind. Even in this
case, however, the board, without dissent from its labor representatives,
agreed to insert a clause to the effect that "the functions of management
are vested exclusively in the Company except as modified by the specific
provisions of this agreement." The union was enjoined from interfering
"in the rights of the management in the matter of hiring, transfer, or
promotion of any employees and in the general management of the
plant." The board's only objection was to the employer's proposed "long
list" of exclusive management functions.
The basis for the decision became dear in the later B anner Iron Works
case: "The rights are inherent in management anyhow."92 Nevertheless,
the board in 1 942, often without comment, began to approve manage
ment requests to insert clauses into collective bargaining agreements
which would protect specific management rights.93 Inherent rights, ap
parently, were sometimes deemed worthy of clear expression. These
clauses generally gave management, among other things, the exclusive
power to hire, promote, fire for just cause, and to maintain and schedule
production. Moreover, the clauses often explicitly acknowledged the em
ployer's exclusive control over the products to be manufactured as well
as the location of plants.94
91ln re Arcade Malleable Iron Co., War Labor Reports 1 (1942): 153.
92War Labor Reports 15 (1944): 332, 335.
93Because of space limitations and my own interests, I have not discussed internal debates
within the board. The emphasis here is on the board's orders and parallels in current
law.
94Levenstein, Labor Today and Tomorrow, 109; In re Fulton County Glove Industry, War
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Under the rubric of "plant operations," the WLB deferred to many as
pects of management decision making. For instance, the board denied a
union request to reestablish a six-day workweek instead of a five-day
swing-shift week, stating that "this matter is a technical administrative
problem, which should be left to management to decide, involving as it
does the rearrangement of working schedules by large-scale transfers of
personnel and changes in the entire system of the company's opera
tions."95 The War Labor Board also generally believed that restriction and
arbitration of employee transfers would interfere with efficiency.96
Indeed, the board's decisions on the scope of managerial prerogatives
were far broader than the positions of the postwar NLRB. For instance,
the War Labor Board held that even the distribution of overtime work
was within the exclusive prerogative of management. Thus, the board
denied a union's request for an equal division of overtime work on the
ground that the "ultimate decision as to who is qualified to perform
specific overtime work should rest with management."97 Other matters
swept into the broad management prerogatives category were the initi
ation of technological changes, even if layoffs should occur, determina
tion of the size of the work force, and the determination of supervisory
members.98 Subcontracting work was also generally regarded as a man
agerial prerogative despite a union's claim that the company had used
subcontracting in the past to evade contractual provisions and wage
rates.99
Nor were "management functions" to be subject to arbitration.100
Thus, the board had occasion to exclude expressly from arbitration the
transfer and promotion of employees, the adjustment of piece rates, the
determination whether additional emplbyees should be hired for certain
Labor Reports 4 (1942): 307; Teller, "The War Labor Board and Management Func·
tions," 322 n. 1 1.
95Mead Corp., War Labor Reports 8 ( 1 943): 471, 474; Towne Robertson Nut Co., War
Labor Reports 3 (1942): 40.
96See, for example, Detroit Steel Products Co., War Labor Reports 6 ( 1 943): 495.
97Bethlehem Steel, War Labor Reports 11 (1943): 190, 196.
98Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc., War Labor Reports 8 (1943): 274. Western
Union Telegraph Co., War Labor Reports 6 (1943): 133; Petroleum Specialties Co.,
War Labor Reports 24 (1945): 597. (The board refused the union request to remove a
supervisor who had been convicted of assaulting employees.)
99Tinius Olsen Testing Machine Co., War Labor Reports 11 (1943): 301; Bethlehem Steel
Co., War Labor Reports 6 (1943): 513. Yet, in one case the board approved a clause
restricting subcontracting until all employees were fully employed and the full capacity
of plants utilized. Fulton County Glove Industry, War Labor Reports 4 (1942): 307.
100Teller, "The War Labor Board and Management Functions," 329.
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operations, the retention of probationary employees, and the determi
nation of work schedules. 101
The board's willingness to grant a detailed management prerogative
clause, after its initial refusal to do so, actually reflects a more liberal
approach to collective bargaining. The board initially may have believed
that no explication of management rights was required because they were
"inherent" in the relationship. This is a reflection of what could be
referred to as the "Genesis" theory of collective bargaining, one often
found in judicial decisions and especially in postwar arbitration awards.
"In the beginning," the theory goes, there was light, and then there were

inherent managerial powers over the direction o f the enterprise. Such
power obviously included unfettered control to direct production and

the work force and to make all decisions involving these matters. Later
there came statutes and collective bargaining, but employers nevertheless
still possess all powers that have not been expressly restricted by statute

1

'

or agreement. The inclusion of express managerial rights in collective �
agreements, however, weakens the argument that certain prerogatives
are "inherent" in the relationship.

A more sophisticated argument, and one made by the conservative
legal scholar Ludwig Teller, is that collective bargaining was a replace
ment rather than a supplement to common law theories of labor relations. ,
Thus, collective bargaining was created to supplant "common law in
dividualism" with "new conceptions suitable to problems and situations
that did not exist when the common law molded its intensely individu
alistic structure." Teller was aware that having replaced the old order
with the new, "organized labor is properly suspicious of efforts to give
continued life to the old order through the medium of emphasis upon
'the common law rights of management.' " Moreover, as many observers
of industrial relations recognized, there is no objective or rational way
to determine what is or what is not a managerial prerogative. 1 02 A decision
concerning which matters should be exclusively in the managerial domain
is basically a determination of the area from which labor should be
excluded. In addition, as David Montgomery's work has shown, the
context of this issue involves those areas in which management/ownership
10 1 Ibid., 339. See also, Bethlehem Steel Corp., War Labor Reports 1 1 (1943): 190. Similarly,
the hazardous nature of the work was used to deny arbitral jurisdiction over transfer
and promotion grievances, suggesting some lack of faith in both arbitrators and unions.
Atlas Powder Co., War Labor Reports 5 (1942): 371.
1 02Teller, "The War Labor Board and Management Functions," 348-49; Atleson, Values
and Assumptions in American Labor Law, chapter 9.
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has taken power from employees as well as those areas in which collective
employee action and statutes have restricted managerial control.
An explicit managerial prerogatives clause offers a number of other
values, both real and symbolic. First, according to Teller, it "has certain
value in teaching the contracting union to think in terms of the problems
and rights of management."103 More importantly, such a clause limits
the scope of proper union concern, a serious matter in a period in which
many unions were both developing and experiencing economic power.
Thus, the board upheld the grant of a management functions clause by
a regional board because:
the present union is a new union and the inclusion of the clause will serve to
educate the union more definitely as to management functions, thus serving to
reduce the areas of conflict between union and management without loss of
protection of the union under the other terms of the contract and especially of
1 4
the grievance machinery. 0

In addition, the managerial functions clause creates a source of legiti
mation when management takes a particular action, a further reflection
of the contractualization of labor-man�gement relations.
The War Labor Board's recognition of a zone of managerial exclusivity
would eventually be employed by the Supreme Court to narrow the scope
of bargaining under the NLRA. The Supreme Court held in 1 964, for
instance, that subcontracting, at least in certain situations, was within
the ambit of mandatory bargaining in Fibreboard Paper Products v.
NLRB. 1 05 The opinion, typical of Warren Court opinions, began with
broad statements of policy only to finish by narrowing the ruling to the

precise and very limited facts of the case before it. 1 06 A concurring opinion

by Justice Potter Stewart noted that not "every management decision
which necessarily terminates an individual's employment is subject to the
duty to bargain." Echoing Montgomery Ward, Stewart noted that even
decisions clearly affecting "conditions of employment" are excluded be
cause of the nature of the managerial action, listing, among others, de
cisions to invest in labor-saving machinery or decisions to liquidate assets
103Teller, "The War Labor Board and Management Functions," 349.
104United Aircraft Corp., War Labor Reports 1 8 (1944): 9.
105379 u.s. 203 (1964).
106"We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to hold, as we do now,
that the type of 'contracting' involved in this case-the replacement of employees in the
existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work
under similar conditions of employment-is a statutory subject of collective bargaining
under § 8 (d)." Ibid., 223.
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and go out of business. These decisions, Stewart argued, "lie at the core
of entrepreneurial control." Stewart's explanation was that "decisions
concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of
the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of em
ployment, though the effect of the decision may be necessary to terminate
employment." Thus, excluded from the zone of mandatory bargaining
are matters of capital investment and decisions "fundamental to the basic
direction of a corporate enterprise." 1 07 Despite the union's victory in
Fibreboard, Stewart's cautionary phrases were not significantly at vari
ance with the majority's conclusion that mandatory bargaining in this
instance would not "significantly abridge [the employer's] freedom to
manage the business."
The Court's concern for the freedom to manage would subsequently
become the basis for restrictive rulings of the Burger Court. In 1 9 8 1 , for
instance, the Supreme Court held that a partial closing of the enterprise
was not subject to mandatory bargaining.108 The issue, said Justice Black
mun, is whether a decision to terminate "should be considered part of
petitioner's retained freedom to manage its affairs unrelated to employ
ment." Like the War Labor Board, Blackmun thus assumed that an
inherent body of exclusive management functions existed, and "man
agement must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to
the extent essential for the running of a profitable business." Congress,
said the Court, "had no expectation that the elected union representative
would become an equal partner in the running of the business enterprise
in which the union's members are employed." 1 09

C ON C LU S I O N

Although there are negative aspects o f contractualism and legalization,
there are also clear advantages for unions. Institutionally, grievance pro
cedures, like collective bargaining, centralize power in the hands of union
officials, but there are gains for employees as well. Guarantees written
into collective agreements cannot easily be taken away, and this becomes
the basis for one of the unions' most powerful arguments for represent
ative status. In light of labor's relative weakness, the constant and very
107379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
108First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
109lbid., 676 (1981).
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real threat of hostile legislation throughout the war, and the erosion of
public support due to wartime strikes, these gains are significant.

1 10

The WLB strongly criticized strikes as early as mid-1942, and public
member Wayne L. Morse, especially upset over union jurisdictional con
flicts, warned that the laws against treason would be applied to strikers
in such disputes. In the Seventy-seventh Congress alone, twenty-one bills
were introduced dealing with wartime strikes, three of which sought to
make strikes in defense plants treasonous and punishable by death. Em
ployer groups, notably the National Association of Manufacturers,
charged that strikes were damaging war production even though work
days lost due to strikes were very low. It was the successive miners' strikes
of 1943 that made that year so exceptional, walkouts that led to the War
Labor Disputes Act of 1 943 and helped inflame public opinion against
strikes.

111

Nevertheless, despite the gains, the practices and law of arbitration
also have negative effects on industrial democracy. First, arbitration fo
cuses upon the written agreement as the exclusive source of employee
rights. The agreement is the result of economic struggle and, thus, rep
resents the balance or imbalance of economic power. Indeed, the reliance
upon contractualism means that rights are based upon the very kinds of
economic imbalance that the Wagner Act sought to ameliorate. More
over, the relative power of the parties is itself affected by the interpre
tations of the NLRA, often not favorable to union interests, especially
in periods when unions are perceived to be weak. Second, arbitration
removes the conflict, and its resolution, from the workplace and its af
fected workers. Just as important, arbitration and centralized bargaining
alter the kinds of issues that are thought to be important.
Finally, arbitration procedures reflect the hierarchical system of the
plant, and the substantive rules indicate, despite the rhetoric, that no
11 0 Strong pressures were applied to unions during both the mobilization period and the
war to curb the rank and file and strikes in general. Indeed, proposals for outlawing
strikes in defense plants were introduced as early as 1941. Seidman, American Labor
from Defense to Reconversion, 43-46. Hatton W. Sumners, chair of the House Judiciary
Committee, suggested that "If it is necessary to preserve this country, [the committee]
would not hesitate one split second to enact legislation to send them to the electric chair."
New York Times, 29 March 1941.
Four days later a bill was introduced to make strikes treasonable, providing for
twenty-five years in prison as a minimum penalty and execution as the maximum sen
tence. Throughout the war period, unions would fear such legislation and such fear
would explain a good deal of their behavior.
1 11 Seidman, American Labor from Defense to Reconversion, 135-42; David Ziskind, "The
Impact of the War on Labor Law," Law and Contemporary Problems 9 (1942): 3 85.
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participatory democracy is to be created. The key rule of arbitration, that
employees must obey work orders and grieve, makes it clear that man
agement may act upon its interpretation of the agreement but the union
may not. Arbitration becomes the device to maintain production and the
only avenue to test the union's view of its contractual rights. Inherent in
the rule itself is a choice of managerial hegemony and continued pro
duction over more participatory industrial self-government.
This is not to argue that legal rules necessarily reflect reality or sub
stantially affect behavior. The argument is only that the very assumptions
of, and tensions within, pluralist thought would affect the shape of post
war law and aid in creating restrictive rulings, especially when labor's '
power is perceived to wane. Pluralist thought, after all, was immeasurably
aided by the appearance of relative equality in the postwar period. Alan
Fox's perceptive analysis of labor relations in the United Kingdom in the
early 1 970s is also applicable to the experience of the United States to
the 1 970s. With few exceptions, labor accepted
as given those major structural features which are crucial for the power, status
and rewards of the owners and controllers. It is because this condition is usually
fulfilled that owners and controllers are rarely driven to call upon their reserves
of power in any overt and public exercise. Only the margins of power are needed
to cope with marginal adjustments. This, then, is what accounts for the illusion
of a power balance. Labour often has to marshal all its resources to fight on
these marginal adjustments; capital can, as it were, fight with one hand behind
1 12
its back and still achieve in most situations a verdict that it finds tolerable.

The generally superior power of capital has been unleashed in a period
when reduced profit margins and international competition induced man
agement to contest labor and working conditions, the one aspect of
production over which it has historically had most control.
Arbitration is but·a part, albeit perhaps a necessary part, of collective
bargaining, and it is no more confining than bargaining itself. Bargaining,
after all, is affected by relative economic power, and imbalances will be
reflected in the resulting contracts that arbitrators are called upon to
interpret. Perhaps the most important legacy of the War Labor Board is
its view that the scope of bargaining is itself limited to only those matters
not deemed critical to managerial efficiency and, especially, capital mo
bility. Such assumptions after the war became part of the underlying basis
112

Alan Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (London: Faber and
Faber 1974), 279-80.
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of the NLRA, helping to render unions impotent when faced with the
torrent of plant removals and closures in the 1 970s and 1 9 8 0s.
Pluralist premises rest upon substantially equal power because
only then can collective bargaining be considered "industrial self
government." The current sharp decline in the labor movement, matched
by a crisis in pluralist circles, reveals that equal power does not exist and
that the bargaining system, both defined and limited by legal decisions,
will not likely result in substantial equality. The seeds of the problem
stem in part from the War Labor Board's recognition and protection of
inherent managerial or property rights, concerns even the needs of war
time could not weaken. The recognition of managerial rights would lead
the Supreme Court to hold in 198 1 that the Wagner Act Congress "had
no expectation that the elected representative would become an equal
partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the union's
members are employed."
The pluralists as well as the War Labor Board deferred to the rights
of owners and managers to direct their enterprises, although they qualified
the arbitrary exercise of such power by insisting that responsible unions
have a voice in the determination of those conditions of employment that
did not invade the protective zone of managerial prerogative. The conflict
between the protection of management decision making and the en
couragement of collective bargaining has never been resolved, either by
the pluralists or the courts. 1 1 3 The language of pluralism reflected in the
writings of scholars and arbitrators is proudly antitheoretical and ahis
torical. The pluralist vision is seen as pragmatic, an emphasis on what
worked. Thus, William P. Murphy, president of the National Academy
of Arbitrators during its fortieth year, recently discussed the accomplish
ments and continued problems of arbitration. Some problems such as
"reserved management rights, implied obligations, past practice," he
noted, still remained unresolved. Murphy suggested "that the subject has
no final definitive answer, that we are now burdened by over-analysis,
and that the best a conscientious arbitrator can do is to be aware of and
understand the various points of view and then do what seems right in
the particular case."114 Noteworthy are both the absence of any discus11 3Stone, "The Post-war Paradigm," 1544-58; Atleson, Values and Assumptions in Amer
ican Labor Law, chapter 9.
114William Murphy, "The Presidential Address: The Academy at Forty," in Gladys Gruen
berg, ed., Arbitration 1 987: The Academy at Forty, Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual
Meeting of the NAA (Washington, D.C.: BNA, 1987), 9.
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sion of the profound changes in industrial structure and labor relations
and the assumption that choices of the unresolved issues in arbitration
do not involve choices in policy and theory. Another reaction in industrial
relations circles is simple denial that fundamental changes have occurred
1
in American industrial and labor relations. 1 5
Collective b argaining in its decentralized American form has left the
labor movement particularly dependent upon the success and viability
of certain mass production industries. Their decline weakens the insti
tutional strength of unions, but the unions' history provides no way to
question current institutional arrangements or to propose transformative
ideas. Union structure has tended to match that of the employers with
whom they bargain, but locally based bargaining would appear to make
little sense in relation to large, multiplant firms with typically centralized
labor policy making. Moreover, the modern growth of conglomerates
and multinational corporations drastically affects the power relationships
of labor and capital. Unions find themselves increasingly dealing with
firms that can easily weather economic struggles, conceal information,
and transfer, or more credibly threaten to transfer, work to other locales
or, indeed, other countries. This drastic change in corporate and capital
structure mandates a rethinking of our labor laws.
Labor law reform, however, is unlikely so long as unions are perceived
to be weak, for the system responds to the strong and the troublesome.
Instead, unions are likely to participate more willingly in "non
adversarial" participation schemes, such as quality circles and team ar
rangements, generally more favored by employees than union officials.
These arrangements, hearkening back to employee representation struc
tures in the early part of the century, 1 1 6 will like y become the hallmark

_l

of unorganized employers as well. A 1982 survey found that at least a
third of Fortune 500 companies, organized and unorganized, have some
form of participative management or quality of worklife program and
that such programs have generally resulted in improved employee morale
and increased productivity. 1 1 7 Although these arrangements are some115See, for instance, John Dunlop, "Have the 1980's Changed U.S. Industrial Relations?"
Monthly Labor Review 1 1 1 :5 (May 1988): 29.
116Thomas Kohler, "Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section
8 (a) (2)," Boston College Law Review 27 (1986): 519-27; Sanford M. Jacoby, Em
ploying Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Transformation of Work in American
Industry, 1 900-1 945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 187-89; Reinhard
Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956).
1170ffice of Economic Research, New York Stock Exchange, People and Productivity: A
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times created to deter the possibility of union organization, they tend in
organized workplaces to deal with matters not covered by collective
bargaining. Indeed, participation plans in unionized workplaces generally
restrict the jurisdiction of participatory arrangements to matters not cov
ered by the collective agreement. These arrangements, therefore, actually
recognize the failure of collective bargaining to deal with the full range
of employee interests and to respond to employee concerns for integrity
on the job.
Challenge to Corporate America (November 1982). See Michael J. Piore and Charles F.
Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 240-50.

